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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee, :
v.

s

NICHOLAS GARCIA RAMIREZ,

:

Case No. 920148-CA

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.s
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of aggravated assault,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1990), entered as a
class A misdemeanor pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (Supp.
1992).

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah

Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(f) (1992).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The only issue on appeal is:
Did the trial court commit reversible error in
concluding that the victim's identification of defendant was
reliable and, therefore, admissible?
In reviewing a trial court's determination of the
constitutional admissibility of eyewitness identification, the
court's factual findings are reversed only if clearly erroneous;
its legal conclusion is reviewed for correctness.

State v.

Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 1991); State v. Adams, 830 P.2d
310, 311 (Utah App. 1992).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The text of any constitutional provision, statute or
rule relevant to a determination of this case is contained in the
body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with attempted second degree
murder, a second degree* felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-5-203 and § 76-4-102 (1990), and aggravated robbery, a first
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1990)
(R. 6-7). Realizing that State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 393 (Utah
1989) precluded the charging of attempted felony-murder, the
State amended the homicide count to aggravated assault, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1990)
(R. 4, 8-9, 42-46).
Defendant moved to suppress the victim's eyewitness
identification (R. 53-61).

After a two-day evidentiary hearing,

the motion was denied (R. 70, 72, 78, 326-333).

Defendant

petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for interlocutory review; the
petition was denied (R. 80, 83-89).
On February 14, 1992, defendant entered a conditional
no contest plea to aggravated assault, reserving his right to
appeal the denial of the motion to suppress (R. 106, 121-25).
The conviction was entered as a class A misdemeanor and the
robbery count was dismissed.

Defendant was given credit for time

served and released from custody the same day (R. 107, 121-26).
Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal (R. 109-10).
2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Shortly before noon on December 1, 1990, three
individuals assaulted Leslie Norwood (R. 199, 255). One hit Mr,
Norwood on the head; another stabbed him five times with a small
knife (R. 199, 205, 209, 240). At the time, Mr. Norwood was
drunk (R. 173, 181).
Mr. Norwood told the police that a "male mexican" named
"Chico" had stabbed him; he said they had met the night before at
a transient camp (R. 134-35, 137, 201-03, 253-55, 263). Mr.
Norwood was shown a photo-spread but he did not identify anyone
(R. 138-39).

Defendant's picture was not in the photo-spread (R.

151, 163).
Defendant was arrested on December 20, 1990 (R. 139).
In late January, 1991, the police drove Mr. Norwood to the
preliminary hearing courtroom.

During the drive, a detective

told Mr. Norwood, "[W]e have arrested the person who has stabbed
you" (R. 140-42, 162, 237). In the courtroom, defendant was the
only male in handcuffs and jail garb (R. 238-39).

When Mr.

Norwood saw him, he immediately told his companion that defendant
was the person who stabbed him (R. 209-10).
In late March, 1991, Mr. Norwood identified defendant
in a lineup (R. 142-43).
Additional facts concerning the eyewitness
identification will be discussed in the argument portion of this
brief as relevant to the specific findings of the trial court.

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Due process requires a trial court to determine the
reliability of an eyewitness identification prior to its
admission at trial.

The trial court must examine the

circumstances surrounding the criminal episode and the subsequent
identification and then determine if, under the totality of these
circumstances, the identification is reliable.

The trial court's

conclusion of admissibility is independent of the jury's ultimate
determination of the weight to accord the identification.
On appeal, the trial court's factual findings must be
upheld unless contrary to the clear weight of the evidence.
However, its legal conclusion of reliability and, therefore,
admissibility is reviewed for correctness.

Here, the trial

court's factual findings:
(1) that the victim had the physical and
mental capacity to accurately observe the
events, and
(2) that the subsequent identification of
defendant was not a product of suggestion
are contrary to the clear weight of the evidence.

Because these

two factors are integral to the determination of reliability,
there are insufficient facts to support the trial court's
conclusion of admissibility.

4

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS THAT (1)
THE VICTIM HAD THE CAPACITY TO OBSERVE HIS
ASSAILANT AND (2) THE VICTIM'S IDENTIFICATION
OF DEFENDANT WAS NOT A PRODUCT OF SUGGESTION,
ARE AGAINST THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
BECAUSE THE ERRONEOUS FACTUAL FINDINGS ARE
INTEGRAL TO THE IDENTIFICATION, THERE ARE
INSUFFICIENT FACTS TO SUPPORT THE LEGAL
CONCLUSION THAT THE IDENTIFICATION WAS
RELIABLE.
Due process requires a trial court to determine the
reliability of eyewitness identification evidence prior to
allowing its admission at trial,

Neil v. Biqqers, 409 U.S. 188,

198-99, 93 S. Ct. 375, 381-82 (1972) (federal due process
requires that only reliable identifications are admitted into
evidence); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 780 (Utah 1991) (state
due process mandates an analytical "in-depth appraisal of the
identification's reliability" prior to its admission); State v.
Long, 721 P.2d 483, 490 (Utah 1986) (setting out the empirical
factors necessary to a state constitutional assessment of
identification evidence).
Defendant properly preserved a challenge to the
eyewitness identification of defendant by the victim, Leslie
Norwood, on both state and federal constitutional grounds (R.5361).

While defendant attacks several aspects of the

identification, his primary arguments are: (1) that due to
intoxication, the victim lacked the capacity to reliably observe
and recall his assailant; and (2) that the circumstances
surrounding the victim's subsequent identification of defendant
were suggestive.

The State agrees that the trial court's
5

findings concerning these two factors are against the clear
weight of the evidence.1
Since the state constitutional standard is more
stringent than the federal, only the state constitutional
analysis will be addressed.

For even if the federal standard

were met, failure to meet state constitutional requirements would
still mandate reversal.

Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784.

To comply

with state due process, a trial court must determine the
reliability of the eyewitness identification by making a detailed
assessment of the totality of facts surrounding the criminal
episode as well as the identification.

Ld. at 781. This

includes consideration of:
"(1) the opportunity of the witness to view the actor
during the event;
(2) the witness's degree of attention to the actor at
the time of the event;
(3) the witness's capacity to observe the event,
including his or her physical and mental acuity;
(4) whether the witness's identification was made
spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or
whether it was the product of suggestion; and,
(5) the nature of the event being observed and the
likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember
and relate it correctly."
Id. (quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 493).
To properly assess any errors, the trial court's
factual findings concerning each Ramirez factor will be examined
1

The trial court orally announced its findings and conclusion
during the evidentiary hearing (R. 326-33). No written findings
were entered (R. 78). A copy of the oral ruling is attached as an
addendum of this brief.
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in light of the record facts.

In doing so, the evidence must be

viewed as a whole and "in the light most favorable to the trial
court's decision" of reliability-

Id. at 781-82. Only when a

factual finding conflicts with the clear weight of the evidence
is it erroneous. JEd. at 782. Whether the facts, when so viewed,
are "sufficient to demonstrate reliability is a question of law,"
which is reviewed for correctness.

Id.

A. The Trial Court's Analysis of the
Opportunity of the Victim to View the Actor
The first factor in determining the reliability of
eyewitness identification is the opportunity of the witness to
view the actor during the event, including consideration of the
length of period of observation, the distance between the witness
and actor, the lighting conditions, whether the witness had ever
seen the actor in the past, whether the witness saw the actor's
face, and whether the actor's features were visible or disguised.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782; Long, 721 P.2d at 494.
The trial court stated that it was considering two
events: (1) the time when Mr. Norwood claimed to have met
defendant at the transient camp; and (2) the time of the stabbing
(R. 327). As to the first, the court found that the night before
the stabbing, Mr. Norwood had been drinking (R. 327). Mr.
Norwood was sleepy when defendant came to the camp and briefly
met him (R. 327). These findings are supported by the record (R.
199-204, 211-17).

Turning to the stabbing, the court found that

Mr. Norwood's assailant was only eight inches away from him when
the assault occurred (R. 328). This finding is supported by the
7

record (R. 205). Additionally, it is undisputed that the assault
took place in the daytime and was brief (R. 204-05).
The court then stated:
. . . [Mr. Norwood] says the words, the fact
that — to the effect, "Damn, Chico, you
stabbed me." He knew his name. He
remembered his name.
Now, he also reiterated this same
statement at the hospital, Chico stabbed me.
He must have remembered something from the
night before when he met the individual.
(R. 328). While it is uncontroverted that Norwood made these
statements (R. 134-37, 150, 205, 240-42), the court improperly
considered this as demonstrative of the witness's opportunity to
observe.

However, a witness's level of certainty, while a

legitimate factor under the federal constitutional standard, is
not to be considered in a state constitutional analysis.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781. The fact that the victim called his
assailant "Chico" during the encounter and continued to believe
that "Chico" was his assailant does not validate the
identification of defendant to any greater degree than any
victim's belief that he recognizes the actor as someone he
previously knew.

To accept the victim's certainty that it was

"Chico" who stabbed him is to beg the question of whether that
belief is reliable.

Accord Long, 721 P.2d at 490 ("Research has

also undermined the common notion that the confidence with which
an individual makes an identification is a valid indicator of the
accuracy of the recollection."). But, the consistency of the
victim's statements is relevant under the fourth Ramirez factor,
whether the identification was suggestive or a product of the
8

witness's own memory.
B. The Trial Court's Analysis of the
Witness's Degree of Attention to the Actor at
the Time of the Event
The second factor in assessing reliability calls for
the trial court to determine the witness's degree of attention to
the actor at the time of the event, including whether there were
any distracting noises or activities during the observation.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782-83; Long, 721 P.2d at 494. The trial
court viewed this factor as also encompassing the issue of
whether the witness viewed the event as significant (R. 328-29).
While this is consistent with Long, under Ramirez it is
considered as the separate fifth factor.
at n.8, with Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781.

Compare Long, 721 P.2d

In relation to these

facts, the distinction is not critical.
The trial court found that the victim had paid close
attention during the stabbing (R. 328-29).
this finding.

The evidence supports

Contrary to defendant's assertions that Mr.

Norwood never saw his assailant's face (Br. of Appellant at 4,
10, 14, 21), Mr. Norwood testified that he did not see who hit
him but did fully observe the face of the person who stabbed him
(R. 199, 205, 209, 240). At the time, they were face to face and
only eight inches apart (R. 205, 209). Additionally, the court's
finding that the stabbing was a significant event creating a
greater degree of attentiveness on the part of the victim was
proper.

Long, 721 P.2d at 489.
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C. The Trial Court's Analysis of the
Witness's Capacity to Observe the Event
While the trial court's analysis of the first two
Ramirez factors is factually supportable, its finding that Mr.
Norwood had the physical and mental capacity to reliably observe
his assailant is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence and
is, therefore, clearly erroneous.
Ramirez mandates that in evaluating a witness's
physical and mental acuity, the trial court must consider any
impairments due to stress, fright, fatigue, injury, drugs,
alcohol, uncorrected visual defects, personal motivations, biases
or prejudices. JEd. at 783; Long, 721 P.2d at 488, 494. Here,
the trial court entered a finding concerning only one fact, Mr.
Norwood's intoxication.

The court stated:

There was no question he was drunk. I was
not persuaded he had taken any drugs.
There's no question there were track marks on
his arm, but there's been a reasonable
explanation given. There was no evidence —
he said he didn't take drugs. There's no
evidence that he did take drugs. I am not
persuaded that he did. I am persuaded he did
drink a lot and was intoxicated at the time.
I am persuaded that he had a high tolerance
for drinking, that he drank continually, that
it was his normal way of life, so to speak,
and even the expert said that a percentage of
the Indian race has a higher tolerance
although he couldn't say that a person of the
Cherokee race — specifically of the Navajo.
(R. 329).
The evidence of the victim's intoxication and its
impact on his capacity to observe were only challenged by Mr.
Norwood's claim that he had not been drinking the morning of the
10

stabbing (R. 220). The evidence established that Mr. Norwood was
a chronic alcoholic (R, 182, 184). On the night he met defendant
at the transient camp, he had been drinking vodka and beer (R.
203, 213). He was tired (R. 216). Expert testimony established
that when a person has been drinking, his ability to accurately
recall an event is substantially diminished (R. 185, 273).
Accord Long, 721 P.2d 488-90 (discussing similar empirical data
concerning numerous factors which may diminish a person's ability
to accurately remember and recall).

Studies have established

that as little as an hour later, the imbiber's memory of what he
observed while drinking is affected (R.196-97).

Here, the expert

testified that the fact that Mr. Norwood was drinking at the time
he met defendant would affect his ability to accurately identify
defendant the next day (R. 196-96, 275).
Immediately following the stabbing, the victim was
taken to the hospital.

The attending doctor found Mr. Norwood

to be "stuporous," meaning that he was closer to "comatose or
nearly dead" than lucid (R. 173, 178-79).

The doctor opined that

this was the result of intoxication rather than his injuries (R.
174, 179). Chemical analysis established Mr. Norwood's blood
alcohol level at .364 percent, four times the legal limit (R.
173).

Relatively the same level was present at the time of the

stabbing (R. 181). Mr. Norwood was unaware of his surroundings
and non-responsive except to pain (R. 173-74).
A toxicology expert testified that a .364 percent blood
alcohol level would severely inhibit a person's capacity to
11

accurately observe or recall events (R. 185-86)•

The expert

testified:
[N]o individual could sustain that blood
alcohol concentration unless they were an
individual who drank excessively for many,
many years on a routine daily basis or if in
fact they were a diagnosed alcoholic of some
considerable years* Only even then would an
individual in my experience be able to stand
upright, if you will, be able to tolerate
physically that amount of alcohol.
(R. 184). But, such chronic alcoholics would still
suffer very severe impairments in their
mental abilities and other of their
faculties, whether or not they showed
physical disabilities.
(R. 185). The court's finding that this level of intoxication
would not affect Mr. Norwood's mental processes to the same
degree as a non-alcoholic is clearly contrary to the weight of
the evidence.
The related finding that Mr. Norwood's half-Cherokee
status insulated him from full impairment of his mental processes
is also contrary to the evidence.

The toxicologist testified

that studies have demonstrated that some Southwestern Native
Americans, such as the Navajos, can tolerate more alcohol than
Caucasians in the sense that at the point when a Caucasian
drinker would be in a coma, a Navajo drinker may still be able to
walk (R. 191). When asked if the same was true of Cherokees, the
toxicologist stated that he did not know (R. 192). Again, as in
the case of chronic alcoholics, the toxicologist explained that
even though the observable physical impairments might differ, the
ability to accurately process information remained equally
12

affected (R. 185, 191-94).
The court additionally failed to consider the effects
of stress, fright, fatigue and injury.

Mr. Norwood admitted that

he was physically ailing prior to the stabbing.

While denying

that he had been drinking on the morning of the stabbing, Mr.
Norwood testified that he was hung-over (R. 220). He had a
headache, felt weak and had dry heaves (R. 222-23).

He was

surprised when he was "jumped" (R. 242). The hit prior to the
stabbing left him "dazed" and "fading" (R. 241-42).

An expert

testified that the effects of the hang-over together with the
stress and injury of being hit would all affect the victim's
capacity to accurately observe (R. 269-274).
Both experts agreed that, under these circumstances, it
would be extremely unlikely that Mr. Norwood could make a
reliable identification of his assailant (R. 189, 196, 283-84).
While the court was not obligated to accept the experts' opinions
of incapacity, the court did subsequently state that the
testimony was "very strong," and "good [and] reliable" (R. 333).
It was also uncontradicted.

As such, the only factual finding

supportable by the evidence was that Mr. Norwood's capacity to
observe during the stabbing was substantially impaired.

See

State v. Cummins, No. 900419-CA, slip op. at 16 n.25 (Utah App.
August 25, 1992) (noting the severe effects of a blood alcohol
level exceeding .30 percent).
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D. The Trial Court's Analysis of
Suggestibility in the Identification Process
The fourth Ramirez factor involves a consideration of
any suggestibility in the identification process.

It entails

inquiries into whether the witness's identification was
spontaneous and remained consistent; including considerations of
the length of time between the original observation and the
identification; the witness's mental capacity and state of mind
at the time of the identification; the witness's exposure to
opinions and descriptions of others, including photographs,
newspaper accounts and other information or influences that may
have affected the independence of his identification; any
instances when the witness failed to identify the defendant; any
instances when the witness gave a description of the actor
inconsistent with the defendant's appearance; and the
circumstances under which the defendant was presented to the
witness for identification,

Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783-84; Long,

721 P.2d at 494-95 n.8.
The trial court found that the victim consistently
insisted that the person who stabbed him was the person he had
met at the transient camp (R.329-30).

The court found that the

physical descriptions of the assailant given by the victim "did
not differ that much from the two times that it was given" and
was not "that far off" from defendant's appearance (R. 330-31).
The court found that while months had elapsed between the
incident and identifications, the victim had actually made an
immediate identification during the crime by calling out, "Chico,
14

why are you doing this to me?" (R. 330).
Additionally, the court found that when the victim had
the opportunity to observe defendant in the preliminary hearing
courtroom, he immediately identified him (R. 332). The court
found that prior to the courtroom identification, Detective
Howell told the victim, "[W]e have arrested the person that
assaulted you" (R. 332). The victim then went into the
courtroom, observed defendant in jail garb, and told a companion
that defendant was the one who stabbed him (R. 332). Because the
victim had previously observed defendant in the courtroom, the
trial court stated that the subsequent lineup identification was
not "significant" (R. 332).
The record established the following facts.

The victim

was first interviewed by Detective Mendez at the hospital
approximately a week after the stabbing (R. 248-49).

Detective

Mendez, Dr. Schaeffer, and Mr. Norwood testified that he was
lucid and coherent at the time of the interview (R. 177, 207,
262).

Mr. Norwood identified his assailant as "Chico" whom he

had met the first day he was in Salt Lake, which would have been
several days before the stabbing (R. 255, 263-64).

He described

"Chico" as a male "Mexican" with a heavy accent, 160-170 pounds
in weight, with short dark hair (R. 251-52).

Mr. Norwood stated

that he was 5'10" tall and "Chico" was slightly shorter, about
5'8" or 5'9" (R. 207, 235). Detective Mendez did not recall
asking if "Chico" had any tatoos but remembered Mr. Norwood
stating that he did not (R. 253).
15

About four days later, Detective Howell interviewed Mr.
Norwood (R. 134). This time, Mr. Norwood described "Chico" as
being about 5'5" in height, 130-140 pounds, hispanic, with dark
hair and mustache, and about 30 years old (R. 147-49).

He

maintained that he had met "Chico" at the camp but said it was
the night before the stabbing (R. 134-35, 137, 167).
When Mr. Norwood testified, he did not offer an
explanation for the differences in the descriptions given to
Detectives Mendez and Howell.

He did testify that during the

stabbing he had "a good look" at "Chico's" right hand and did not
observe any tatoos (R. 245).
The arresting officer described defendant as "extremely
short" and "heavy set" (R. 257). Defendant is 5'2" in height and
weighs 150 pounds (R. 244, 258).

He is Hispanic but has only a

slight accent which is difficult to discern if only a few words
are spoken (R. 247A).

Both his hands are tattooed.

The right

hand has a two-inch by one-inch cross, another half-inch cross,
and a one-half inch wide line going up and around his wrist; the
left hand has an inch by half-inch black star and a two and onehalf inch by one-half inch solid ribbon (R. 120-21).

Defendant

testified that in December, 1990, he had dark shoulder length
hair and a one-inch beard; the arresting officer testified that
defendant did not have a beard when arrested and may have had
short hair, but he was unsure (R. 119, 257-58).2
2

A photograph of defendant was admitted into evidence
(Exhibit 3). This photograph was taken in March, 1991, at the time
of the lineup (R. 118).
16

The court's finding that the physical descriptions
given by the victim were consistent and reasonably matched that
of defendant is not completely supported by the record.

However,

during the evidentiary hearing, the parties had Mr. Norwood and
defendant stand side-by-side (R. 244). The court then made its
own observations of their relative size and the descriptions
given:
Now, the two individuals stood before the
court and it was indicated that Mr. Ramirez
said he was 5'2" and — Mr. Norwood said he
was 5'10". . . . Yes, he is shorter than
him. Looking at the individual, whether he
is 5'2" to 5'5" in that area, is pretty
difficult.
(R. 331). The trial court was in a unique position to observe
first-hand defendant's physical characteristics and compare them
to the witness's description.

See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784

(recognizing the trial court's unique ability to appraise
demeanor and credibility evidence).

For this reason, the court's

finding that the physical descriptions did not "differ that much"
and were "reasonable" should be given deference.
Turning to the issue of suggestibility in the
preliminary hearing courtroom encounter between defendant and the
victim, the circumstances surrounding the incident were
essentially undisputed.

Detective Howell testified that he

brought Mr. Norwood to the courtroom pursuant to a subpoena in
this case and not specifically to make an identification (R. 14042).

Before entering the courtroom, the detective told Mr.

17

Norwood, "[W]e have arrested the person who stabbed you" (R.
157), or M"[W]e have a person in custody by the name of Chico"
(R. 162). Mr. Norwood then entered the courtroom and observed
only defendant being brought in handcuffed and in jail garb (R.
238-39).

Mr. Norwood turned to his companion and said, "That's

the one that stabbed me coming through the door" (R. 209). He
did not relate this information to the police until the March
lineup (R. 209-10, 239).
The test for determining if a pretrial identification
is sufficiently suggestive as to violate due process is whether
the circumstances surrounding the identification were "so
impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification."
777 P.2d 432, 435

State v. Thamer,

(Utah 1989) (citing Simmons v. United States,

390 U.S. 377, 383, 88 S. Ct. 967, 970 (1968)).

If the pretrial

identification is found to be suggestive, any subsequent
identification "must be based on an untainted, independent
foundation to be reliable."

jxl. (citing Manson v. Brathwaite,

432 U.S. 98, 114, 97 S. Ct. 2243, 2253 (1977)).
Dr. Dodd, a psychologist and eyewitness expert,
testified that the in-court identification was suggestive for
several reasons: (1) it was a one-on-one situation; (2) the
victim had been told that his assailant was in custody; (3)
defendant was presented in jail garb and custody; and (4)
defendant was presented as the person who the State had already
determined should be prosecuted (R. 278-79).
18

The Utah appellate

courts have expressed similar concerns.

See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at

784 (explaining the suggestiveness in procedures focusing on a
single, in-custody defendant); Thamer, 777 P.2d at 435 (noting
that any identification procedure should not emphasize one person
over another and warning against subtle police influences); Long,
721 P.2d at 490 (discussing the subtle distortions which may
occur in the retention or recall stage of identification).
The trial court implicitly found the courtroom
encounter not to be suggestive (R. 331-33).

The court appears to

have ruled that any problem with the pre-encounter statement of
Detective Howell's that the police had arrested Mr. Norwood's
assailant was overcome by Mr. Norwood's "immediate"
identification of defendant when he was brought into the
courtroom (R. 332). As it did in ruling on the victim's capacity
to observe, the trial court accepted as credible the expert's
opinion that the encounter was suggestive but gave it little
weight (R. 333). The court concluded that this case did not have
features of the "more questionable" show-up identification in
Ramirez (R. 333).
The trial court's finding that Mr. Norwood's
identification of defendant was a product of his own memory is
contrary to the weight of the evidence.

As the court noted, this

factor carries great weight in determining the reliability of an
identification (R. 332). See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784. Here,
defendant had been drinking when he first observed "Chico," and
was drunk when assaulted.

Almost two months later, while he is
19

being transported to court to testify in the assault case, he is
told that the police have arrested his assailant.

He then enters

the courtroom and the only male in custody is defendant.

The

court's emphasis on the fact that an identification was
immediately made begs the question of whether it was the product
of suggestion.3
E. The Trial Court's Analysis of the Nature
of the Event Observed
The final factor for the trial court to consider is the
nature of the event observed and the likelihood that the witness
would perceive, remember and relate it correctly, including
whether the event was an ordinary one in the mind of the observer
during the time it was observed and whether the race of the actor
was the same as the observer's.

Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781

(quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 493).
The court here considered one aspect.

The court found

that since the stabbing was so significant an event, the victim
"would remember [his assailant] more as a result of this
particular event" (R. 333). As discussed above (supra at 11),
this was proper.

3

Defendant also raises the issue of whether his sixth
amendment right to counsel was violated in the preliminary hearing
courtroom encounter (Br. of Appellant at 19 n.3). Defendant's
failure to timely raise this issue below renders it waived for
purposes of appeal. State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah
App. 1991). See also State v. Mincv, 192 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 20
(Utah App. July 22, 1992) (holding that no right to counsel exists
at a show-up).
20

F. The Trial Court's Conclusion of
Reliability and Admissibility
In concluding that the identification of defendant was
admissible, the trial court ruled that it could not fully accept
the "strong" and "good reliable testimony" of the two expert
witnesses that Mr. Norwood's capacity to make a reliable
identification was substantially impaired and that the in-court
identification was a product of suggestion because those
circumstances "would not do away with the fact that he had met
this individual . • . [and] remembered his name the next morning
—

he said Chico" (R. 333). This conclusion improperly

considered the certainty of the witness's identification* and
failed to consider the significant weight of the victim's lack of
capacity to accurately observe together with suggestibility in
the identification process.

Even when the facts are viewed in

the light most favorable to the trial court's decision, they
remain insufficient as a matter of law to warrant a preliminary
finding of reliability and, therefore, admissibility.
CONCLUSION
Based on the court's erroneous conclusion that the
eyewitness identification was admissible, the trial court's
denial of defendant's motion to suppress should be reversed and

A

Under the state constitutional standard, the certainty of
the witness in making an identification cannot be considered. See
discussion, supra at 10.
21

the case remanded for proceedings consistent with that ruling.
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should be given to the jury.
THE COURT: Let me indicate that counsel and the
defendant have submitted four cases to the court, two of
which the court was quite familiar with, prior to taking
the bench, and that I have read before in other cases and
which I have reviewed over the evening.

In fact, I read

the Ramirez case Tuesday before taking the bench and
participating in this case. The court did read State v.
Rimmasch and State v. Thamer.

I don't think they add that

much to the matter before the court today.

I think the two

cases that are controlling are State v. Long and State v.
Ramirez of which I will say I dealt with in other cases and
did read the Ramirez case before taking the bench
yesterday, and the court reread it last night, again.
let me state that I think I understand ~

Now

I know I

understand what the court is saying in State v. Ramirez as
far as the responsibility of the trial court in its
determinations as far as the matters of law and to rule on
those questions and not submit them to the jury.

But I am

not sure that as I hear the argument here today and I apply
it to this case, that we, again, to talk of facts and law,
I am not sure that either I am smart enough to distinguish
them or the argument that I am hearing is not
distinguishing these facts.

I think the court has the

responsibility of ruling as a matter of law, if the law is
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I very clear, as to what the situation is as far as
2 identification.

Where it is a factual matter, where

3 reasonable minds could differ, I think it is a jury
4 question, and I don't think Ramirez goes to the point of
5 saying that questions of fact should not be submitted to
6 the jury.

Of course, maybe that would be determined later

7 and I would hope it doesn't say that.
8

So I am looking at this case this way.

I am

9 ruling on it where it is question of fact, I am looking at
10 those questions of facts and making my determination and
11 feel that where reasonable minds will differ, I would
12 submit them to the jury.
13

Now, both of you have argued the Ramirez case as

14

far as the points of which they bring out. And let me go

15

through those with you, the way I am looking at them in

16

this particular case that you both use those.

17

First of all, number one, the opportunity of the

18

witness to view the actor and the event, I look at two

19

events here.

20

fireside or the —

21

stabbing, now, there's no question it was a short time when

22

he met him the evening before. And he admitted he had

23

been—the victim had been drinking and he was sleepy but he

24

did see him.

25

that point you get out of that meeting.

I look at the meeting of the defendant at the
at the fire and at the time of the

Be did meet him.

That's about all right at
But then he
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1 stabbed —

he sees him for eight seconds —

no, eight

2 inches away from him and there he says the words, the fact
3 that —

to the effect, "Damn, Chico, you stabbed me."

4 knew his name.

He remembered his name.

Now, he also reiterated this same statement at

5

6 the hospital, Chico stabbed me.
7

He

He must have remembered

something from the night before when he met the individual.

8

Now, number two, the attention to the gun man,

9

and this is somewhat repetitious of the first, but when I

10 say attention, I am looking at the Ramirez case—I guess I
11 shouldn't say that but the attention given, there was not a
12 great deal of attention given of the night before.

I think

13 when a person is stabbed they begin to give attention.

I

14

refer you to the case of State v. Long where the court in

15

rather extensive discussion goes into an academic

16

discussion concerning things that we remember as they take

17

place, and he says if you ask a person what they were doing

18 when John F. Kennedy was assassinated, they would probably
19

remember.

But if you ask them the color of the car that

20

was in front of them when they stopped at the red light to

21

drive to work this morning, they wouldn't remember.

22

I don't dispute that.

23

individual walking down the street with a knife all

24

strapped to his belt, I probably wouldn't remember that

25

individual but if that individual pulled that knife out and

Well,

I agree with it, that if I saw an
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stabbed me and I knew him, I met him the night before and
he stabbed me, I would remember him.

That is likening to

the situation when John Kennedy was assassinated.

I think

the event brought out to the victim was such a significant
event in his life that he looked very close at that and was
remembering it.
And, three, the reliability factor, does he have
the capacity to remember —had the capacity to remember the
event?

There was no question he was drunk.

I was not

persuaded he had taken any drugs. There's no question
there were track marks on his arm, but there's been a
reasonable explanation given.

There was no evidence—he

said he didn't take drugs. There's no evidence that he did
take drugs.

I am not persuaded that he did.

I am

persuaded he did drink a lot and was intoxicated at the
time.

I am persuaded that he had a high tolerance for

drinking, that he drank continually, that it was his normal
way of life, so to speak, and even the expert said that a
percentage of the Indian race has a higher tolerance
although he couldn't say that a person of the Cherokee race
—

specifically of the Navajo.
Number four, where the identification is made

spontaneously, made consistent at the time of the stabbing,
he said, "Damn it, Chico, you stabbed me."
stabbed me,"

in the hospital.

Be said, "Chico

He told the officer, "Chico
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stabbed me."

So it was consistent as far as what he was

saying.
Five, identification of how long after
identification took place, well, as far as the actual
identifying of the defendant in this case, it took place I
guess some days, weeks after but as far as the
indentification of stating who he was, who had stabbed him,
he identified him immediately.

He didn't see him.

I guess

it was either —

it was months when he saw him.

He

identified him.

It didn't vary from him identifying the

particular individual who had perpetrated the stabbing.
Number six, the descriptions, whether they are
confused or not.

Counsel for the defense makes a great

deal out of the descriptions, and they should and it does
carry a lot of weight, but as I look at these descriptions
I am not persuaded the descriptions are that far off. Now,
my notes stated that he told Officer Howell he was
approximately 5'5", weight is hundred thirty, hundred
forty, Hispanic race, dark hair, mustache, no tatoos,
small, name Chico, couldn't identify him from the photo
spread, saw a person that looked like him on the photo
spread.

To Officer Mendez, he told him weight; hundred

sixty, hundred seventy; height, S'S" to 5f9"; hair color,
dark; hair, short; age, he didn't ask him ~
Mexican.

Marks, didn't ask him.

he said race

He said tatoos, none;
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1

facial hair, he didn't ask him.

2

accent.

3

So that many things Officer Mendez did not go into, of

4

which Officer Howell did go into.

Be said he had a Mexican

He doesn't ask him anything about the clothing.

Now, the two individuals stood before the court

5
6

and it was indicated that Mr. Ramirez said he was 5'2" and

7

— M r . Norwood said he was 5'10". The eight inches

8

difference, counsel brought out the fact that the boots

9 were on.

Of course, counsel argued against that.

The

10

court did see the boots. There's no question that those

11

boots were higher from the type of shoe than the type of

12

shoe that the defendant had on which could have amounted to

13

at least an inch so you have a seven-inch difference. Yes,

14

he is shorter than him.

15

he is 5'2" to 5'5" in that area, is pretty difficult.

Looking at the individual, whether

16

I think he said his weight is a hundred sixty and

17

his weight the second time he said hundred sixty to hundred

18

seventy.

19

sixty —

First time, he said a hundred fifty to hundred
now I take that a hundred thirty to hundred forty.

20

First time he said, there's a weight difference somewhat,

21

but that is something that is flexible so what I am saying

22

is that the description of the individual as far as what

23

was asked him did not differ that much from the two times

24

that it was given.

25

Now, number seven, the question of
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1

suggestibility.

This does carry great weight I think as

2

far as identification is concerned.

3

that has been made in this case was when Officer Howell

4

took the victim to court and said that, "Well, I will have

5

to check my notes exactly what he said, because I believe

The only suggestion

6 we have arrested the person that assaulted you," something
7

to that effect.

Officer Howell was not with him, but the

8

victim, Mr. Norwood, and his partner went into the

9

courtroom, sat down.

They brought the defendant in. Yes,

10

he was dressed in jail garb and he immediately said to his

11

partner, that's the man who stabbed me, his identification

12

then became immediate the first time that he had seen him

13

since the event.

14

he did not see him in the one and he identified the other

15

which I think the photo spreads at that time were probably

16

superfluous but I do think it is significant when the first

17

time he saw the photo spread he said that this man looks

18

like him but it is not him.

19

Then he looked at the photo spreads and

MR. VUYK:

I think what we are talking is the

20

lineups rather than additional photo spreads. There were

21

two lines up.

22

THE COURT:

I am sorry, yes, that is correct.

23

And so as I say, it is not as significant after of course

24

he identified him and had seen him in the courtroom, he

25

then did definitely identify him.

Now, I think that the
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1

experts which have been brought to this court give very

2

strong testimony and the court is not sitting here to try

3

to dispute that testimony, that the testimony is probably

4

good reliable testimony, that it is not something that this

5

court can accept in every particular case and it's not

6

something that would do away with the fact that he had met

7

this individual.

8

—

he said Chico.

9 me."

He remembered his name the next morning
He tells the officer, "Chico stabbed

And he was able to of course, also, give a

10

description of which this court feels was a reasonable

11

description and also able to identify him when he first saw

12

him.

13

Mow, as I compare this case to the identification

14

in State v. Ramirez I think the identification there was

15

much more difficult, much more questionable than in this

16

case and also, as I say, I am putting some weight on the

17

question of the argument that the court —

18

Court uses in the Kennedy situation.

19

remember him more as a result of this particular event and

20

based on that the court does find that the —

21

motion to suppress the evidence as far as the

22

identification and will allow this matter to be submitted

23

to the jury. Any questions?

24

MS. AH CHING: None.

25

MR. VUYK:

the Supreme

I think that he would

denies the

While we are here can we set a trial
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